"This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government---how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes's subtitle suggests, these issues are in the 'Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power'...The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable." ---Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review "This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature." ---Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review "...Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing...The volume makes excellent use of brad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source.Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns.
" ---Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly "...Keynes's treatment of pertinent judicial decision, especially those spawned by the Indochina conflict, is among the most complete now available." ---W. Taylor Reveley III, Columbia Law Review "A fresh examination of the 200-year-old question of presidential and congressional powers in military action and foreign policy, looking particularly at the accretion of power in the hands of the President and the degree to which the judicial branch has attempted, or should attempt, to make decisions in the twilight zone. It is a searching inquiry, ranging from the early years of the republic to the Vietnam War." ---John C. Campbell, Forei