Abstract objects have been a topic of philosophical debate since antiquity. Philosophers have defended various views about abstract objects by appealing to metaphysical considerations, considerations regarding mathematics or science, and, not infrequently, intuitions about natural language. Friederike Moltmann takes a fresh approach and focuses on natural language to pursue the question of how and whether it allows for reference to abstract objects of various
sorts. She makes systematic use of contemporary linguistic semantics and explores a greater range of data and linguistic generalizations than has previously been brought to bear on philosophical
discussions of the abstract. The resulting ontological picture is very different from that generally taken for granted by philosophers, and even semanticists. Reference to abstract objects such as properties, numbers, propositions, degrees, and expression types is considerably more marginal than generally held. Instead, natural language is rather generous in allowing reference to particularized properties (tropes) and the use of expressions that despite their appearance do not actually act as
referential expressions. Reference to truly abstract objects is largely restricted to noun phrases displaying a particular complex linguistic structure that goes along with particular strategies of
reification, such as the number eight. One type of expression that plays a central role in Moltmann's argument is quantifiers such as something, which can take the place of various non-referential expressions and play a central role in various philosophical discussions. She defends an analysis of such quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers, involving the same object-introducing strategies as corresponding nominalizations.