This study assesses whether India will be a reliable security partner for the United States in our efforts to manage the rise of China. U.S. grand strategy since World War Two has centered around maintaining and expanding a rules-based international order that globally promotes democratic governments, international institutions, human rights, and open markets. The prospect for a power transition threatens to disrupt the U.S.-led order. As China rises, the United States will depend on partners and alliances to help preserve the status quo, especially in the maritime domain. As the world's largest democracy and one of the fastest-growing economies, India could play a decisive role in determining the future balance of power. Through depth-analysis of case studies, this study analyzed whether India decided to balance or bandwagon when China challenged India along its borders to include Tibet, Kashmir, and Doklam; threatened intervention during wars with Pakistan; acquired nuclear weapons; and expanded into the Indian Ocean Region. This study proved that, each time China presented India with a major security challenge, India has chosen to balance. The study concludes that, as a long-term investment, the United States should enhance its partnerships with India to balance against China's rise. The chapters in this study are organized as follows. Chapter II is an analysis of the 1962 Sino-Indian War and India's reaction to defeat. Chapter III examines India's willingness to fight Pakistan despite Chinese threats of intervention. Chapter IV looks at India's decision to test a nuclear device in 1974 and 1998 due to China's acquisition of nuclear weapons and increased international prestige. Chapter V examines India's response to China's recent expansion into the IOR. Each chapter first examines the Chinese reactions in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in question. Each chapter then turns to a description of Indian's actions. These historical chapters then conclude with an analysis of India's response, offering judgments about whether India chose to balance or bandwagon in the face of the specific provocation. Chapter VI presents conclusions of the research.