What does it mean to claim that someone ought to believe something or is justified in believing something? Do such claims express beliefs about independently existing facts, or only attitudes of approval and disapproval towards certain beliefs or belief-forming practices? How do putative facts about what people ought to believe or are justified in believing fit in to the natural world? Such questions have been largely ignored, even though the corresponding
questions in ethics have been subject to extensive and systematic investigation. Just as metaethics addresses questions about the meaning of ethical discourse and the nature of the ethical realm,
metaepistemology addresses the corresponding questions about the meaning of epistemic discourse and the nature of the epistemic realm. This collection of new essays by leading philosophers aims to advance the new subdiscipline of metaepistemology. The primary readership will be scholars and graduate students in philosophy who will use it for research and for graduate-level teaching. It is also of interest to those working in other fields in which normative notions play a role, such as economics
and psychology.