This new study considers military space strategy within the context of the land and naval strategies of the past. Explaining why and how strategists note the similarities of space operations to those of the air and naval forces, this book shows why many such strategies unintentionally lead to overemphasizing the importance of space-based offensive weaponry and technology. Counter to most U.S. Air Force doctrines, the book argues that space-based weapons don't imbue superiority. It examines why both air and naval strategic frameworks actually fail to adequately capture the scope of real-world issues regarding current space operations. Yet by expanding a naval strategic framework to include maritime activities--which includes the interaction of land and sea--the breadth of issues and concerns regarding space activities and operations can be fully encompassed.
Commander John Klein, United States Navy, uses Sir Julian Corbett's maritime strategy as a strategic springboard, while observing the salient lessons of other strategists--including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mao Tse-tung--to show how a space strategy and associated principles of space warfare can be derived to predict concerns, develop ideas, and suggest policy not currently recognized. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of military and strategic studies and to those with an interest in space strategy in particular.