Which causal patterns are involved in mental processes?
On what mechanisms does the self-organisation of cognitive structure rest?
Can a naturalistic view account for the basic resources of intentionality, while avoiding the objections to reductive materialism?
By considering the developmental, phenomenological and biological aspects linking mind and causality, this volume offers a state-of-the art theoretical proposal emphasising the fine-tuning of cognition with the complexity of bodily dynamics. In contrast to the de-coupling of mind from the physical environment in classical information-processing models, growth of brain's architecture and stabilisation of perception­-action cycles are considered decisive, with no need for an eliminative approach to representations pursued by neural network models. The tools provided by physics and biology for the description of massive causal interactions, on top of which 'qualitative' changes occur, are exploited to suggest a model of the mind as a many-layered, co-evolving system. (Series A)