The authors argue that institutions' corporate governance roles are an instrument ultimately shaped by private interests and market forces, as well as law and regulatory obligations, and that policy-makers should not readily make assumptions regarding their effectiveness, or their alignment with public interest or social good. They critically discuss the possibilities and limitations of shareholder stewardship i.e. the UK Stewardship Code and the EU Shareholder Rights Directive 2017 as well as explore various reforms of the UK pension fund structures, including the Local Government Pension Funds reform, the move from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes and implications for funds' asset allocation, investment management and corporate governance roles.

This book will be of interest to academics in corporate law and governance as well as those in the corporate governance industry, such as institutions, trade associations, proxy advisors and other corporate governance service providers. Think tanks and research institutes tied to institutional investment, corporate governance, law and business may also be a key audience.