This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the Middle East and South Asia. The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that the theory was developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of stability, over credibility; however, the logic of conventional deterrence is different, and the solution of the tension between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to credibility, due to the requirements of costly signaling. Most testing of the theory took place in conventional deterrence situations and the lessons learned were used to undermine a theory that was developed for the nuclear realm. Tests of deterrence theory do not, however, instill much confidence. Deterrence theory is challenged not only by observations of constant failures but also by the fact that exceedingly weak actors play a prominent role in them.
This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence, and to show how a reconceptualization of the theory that treats deterrence success not as an act of abstention from a challenge in single deterrence encounters but as a process that culminates in the internalization of deterrence is better suited to account for deterrence success, a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long. Studies of immediate deterrence encounters generate a very limited understanding of a far more complex dynamic of deterrence that can be understood only as a process of learning over time from defeat, failure and war. This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security, Middle Eastern studies, and IR in general.