First published in 1986, Military Technology, Military Strategy and the Arms Race argues that a principal factor contributing to the arms race is the military research and development (R and D) sector. It traces the arms race since World War II and explores the relationship between the emergence of new weapon technology, the development of new weapon systems and their impact on strategic thinking. It considers the positions for both the United States and its allies in NATO and for the erstwhile Soviet Union. It argues that military R and D, which consumes an increasing proportion of total funds spent on R and D has developed a self-sustaining technological momentum, which is baked by a powerful military -industrial -bureaucratic- technological complex and is increasingly out of control of political leaders.

The book argues that negotiations to limit the numbers of weapons fail to address the main problem, and that more emphasis should be given to considering ways of limiting and controlling military R and D. It concludes by proposing a radical shift in policy to achieve this. This historical reference work is important for scholars and researchers of military studies, defence studies, international relations, diplomacy and international politics.